The United Nations is negotiating a Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation and two early protocols, with a sixth negotiating session due in Nairobi from 30 November to 10 December 2026 and a mandate to deliver final texts to the General Assembly in late 2027. The process was created by recorded votes, not consensus, and the United States left it in February 2025, while the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework agreed in January 2026 a "side-by-side" package that keeps its own minimum-tax system running. This paper reads the General Assembly resolutions, the negotiating committee's reports and the July 2026 draft texts, sets out what the drafts actually oblige and what they leave blank, and proposes tests for Nairobi that separate legal progress from political noise.
Key findings and scope
- General Assembly resolution 79/235 of 24 December 2024 adopted the terms of reference for the Framework Convention and established a Member State-led intergovernmental negotiating committee to draft it and two early protocols "simultaneously". It asked for final texts to be submitted in the first quarter of the Assembly's eighty-second session [7, paragraphs 2-3, 11]. The resolution passed by 119 votes to 9, with 43 abstentions [10].
- The terms of reference were themselves adopted in committee by a recorded vote of 110 to 8, with 44 abstentions, on 16 August 2024. The eight votes against were Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States. All 27 European Union member States abstained [8, paragraph 40].
- At the organisational session in February 2025, a proposal to require consensus for all decisions was rejected by 98 votes to 42, with 10 abstentions. The committee instead decided that decisions of substance on a protocol may be taken by a two-thirds majority once consensus efforts are declared exhausted [9, paragraphs 24-25]. On the opening day of that session the United States said it would not participate further and would oppose the outcome [11].
- The co-lead's zero draft of the Framework Convention (21 July 2026) contains commitments on fair allocation of taxing rights, high-net-worth individuals, illicit financial flows, harmful tax practices, dispute prevention and mutual assistance. Many of its operative verbs are cooperative ("shall cooperate", "shall explore"), and the entry-into-force threshold is left as "[number to be determined]" [4, Articles 5-6, 21, 26].
- The draft Protocol on cross-border services would allow source-state taxation of fees for services and income from automated digital services, but the maximum rate is left blank in square brackets [5, Articles 5-6]. The Nairobi programme schedules discussion of the revised Framework Convention and Protocol II on disputes, not Protocol I [3].
This paper uses documents available on 11 November 2026. The negotiating texts are co-lead drafts. They are not agreed text and do not bind any State. Where this paper describes positions in the room, it relies on official reports of the committee, statements published by governments, and, for the fifth session only, a professional summary clearly identified as secondary [19]. The revised draft of the Framework Convention promised for Nairobi had not been located in public form when this paper was written. Its contents are therefore treated as unknown.
1. Why a tax convention became a United Nations question
International tax rules have been shaped for decades mainly through bilateral treaties, model conventions and the work of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), latterly through the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. The UN has a long-standing Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters [15, paragraph 28(c)], but it is an expert body rather than a forum that makes binding rules.
The turn towards a UN convention was procedural before it was substantive. In resolution 77/244 of 30 December 2022, the General Assembly decided to begin intergovernmental discussions in New York on ways to strengthen the inclusiveness and effectiveness of international tax cooperation, and asked the Secretary-General for a report [12, paragraph 2]. The resulting report, A/78/235, concluded that enhancing the UN's role in tax norm-shaping and rule-setting "appears the most viable path". It set out three options: a multilateral convention on tax, a framework convention, or a non-binding framework for cooperation [13, summary].
The Assembly chose the framework route. Resolution 78/230 of 22 December 2023 created an ad hoc committee to draft terms of reference [14]. Those terms of reference, adopted in August 2024 and endorsed by the Assembly in December 2024, now define the negotiating mandate [8, annex I; 7]. The framework convention model is borrowed from environmental and health law. A general treaty sets objectives, principles and institutions, and later protocols carry the detailed obligations. Its appeal is that it lets a broad membership agree on a structure before it agrees on numbers. Its weakness is that States can sign the frame while holding back from the parts that matter.
2. A process built by majority
The voting record matters more here than in most UN negotiations. It shows that the process was designed by a coalition of developing countries against the opposition or abstention of most capital-exporting economies, and that the coalition was willing to keep majority voting as a fallback.
Table 1. Recorded votes that shaped the negotiating process
| Date | Body and question | In favour | Against | Abstaining | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16 August 2024 | Ad Hoc Committee: adoption of draft terms of reference | 110 | 8 | 44 | [8, para. 40] |
| 24 December 2024 | General Assembly: resolution 79/235 as a whole | 119 | 9 | 43 | [10] |
| 24 December 2024 | General Assembly: operative paragraph 2 (adopting the terms of reference) | 112 | 49 | 6 | [10] |
| 6 February 2025 | Negotiating committee: oral amendment to require consensus for all decisions (rejected) | 42 | 98 | 10 | [9, para. 24] |
Note: the General Assembly figures are as announced from the chair in the UN's automated meeting transcript, which is not an official record [10]. After the 16 August 2024 vote, three delegations told the Secretariat they had intended to vote in favour [8, footnote 9]. After the 6 February 2025 vote, one delegation indicated an intention to vote against [9, footnote 2]. Totals are reported as recorded, without adjustment.
Two features stand out. First, the gap between the vote on the resolution as a whole and the separate vote on operative paragraph 2 shows that the objection was concentrated on the substance of the terms of reference. Forty-nine States voted against that paragraph, while only nine voted against the resolution [10]. Many States that abstained on the whole text appear to have been registering objection to its central decision, not indifference.
Second, the decision-making rule adopted in February 2025 is narrower than critics sometimes suggest. Decision 4 requires the committee to "exhaust every effort in good faith to reach consensus" and permits a two-thirds majority only on matters of substance relating to a protocol, once the Chair, on the Bureau's recommendation, says consensus has failed [9, paragraph 25]. For the Framework Convention text itself, the decision sets no separate threshold; it recalls rule 161 of the General Assembly's rules of procedure, which concerns the procedure of subsidiary organs. In practice, the rule gives the majority a credible fallback. It does not license routine voting.
3. What the zero draft actually commits States to
The co-lead's zero draft of 21 July 2026 is the first full text of the Framework Convention in public [4]. It was issued with the two draft protocols for the fifth session, held in New York from 3 to 13 August 2026, and Member States and stakeholders were invited to send written inputs on all three texts [18]. It follows the terms of reference closely. The objectives in Article 1 and the principles in Article 2 reproduce, almost word for word, paragraphs 7 and 9 of the terms of reference [4, Articles 1-2; 8, annex I, paragraphs 7 and 9]. The Convention would be "fully inclusive", would establish "a system of governance for international tax cooperation", and would be guided by sovereignty, alignment with human rights obligations, simplicity and certainty.
The commitments in Part II are where the substance should be. They are carefully calibrated.
- Fair allocation of taxing rights (Article 5). The draft says a fair allocation "shall reflect the real economic contribution" of each jurisdiction, including where "markets are located, revenues are generated and users or data are located", "whether or not such activities involve physical presence". The operative obligation, however, is that States Parties "shall explore and pursue cooperative approaches" [4, Article 5]. This is a statement of principle that favours market and source jurisdictions, attached to a soft duty.
- High-net-worth individuals (Article 6). States "shall cooperate to enhance measures to detect, deter and prevent" avoidance and evasion, "shall share general information" about techniques, and "shall explore coordinated approaches" to effective taxation, explicitly "while respecting each State Party's sovereign right to determine the design, structure and level of taxation" [4, Article 6]. There is no minimum tax on wealth.
- Exchange of information. The draft contains a full exchange-of-information article modelled on familiar treaty language, including the rule that bank secrecy cannot justify refusal. It is bracketed, and its standard ("[may be][is foreseeably] relevant") is open [4, Article 11]. The fact that it appears at all is significant. It would extend information-sharing duties to States that are not in existing networks, if adopted.
- Relationship with existing treaties (Article 21). The draft preserves prior bilateral and multilateral agreements, subject to a duty to take "progressive and meaningful steps" to align them with the Convention, "including, where necessary, the renegotiation of existing agreements". When one Party asks for renegotiation, the other "shall enter into negotiations in good faith and without undue delay", and Parties must report on requests made and received [4, Article 21]. This is the most consequential clause in the draft for existing treaty networks, and the one most likely to be contested.
- Institutions (Articles 13-18). A Conference of the States Parties would review implementation and adopt further protocols. It would also "take into consideration the work of other relevant forums" [4, Article 13]. The draft also creates subsidiary bodies, data collection, review, a secretariat and provisions on financial resources.
- Entry into force (Article 26). The number of ratifications required is "[number to be determined]" [4, Article 26].
The pattern is consistent. Where the draft states principles, it leans towards the positions of developing countries: source and market taxation, attention to wealth, inclusive governance. Where it imposes obligations, it mostly asks States to cooperate, explore, report and negotiate. The hard choices are left to protocols or to numbers not yet written.
4. The two early protocols: where the numbers are missing
The terms of reference required two early protocols to be negotiated alongside the Convention. One was fixed in advance, on the taxation of income from cross-border services in a digitalised economy. The other was to be chosen from a short list [8, annex I, paragraphs 15-16]. In February 2025 the committee chose "prevention and resolution of tax disputes" as the subject of Protocol II [9, paragraph 32].
Protocol I on cross-border services. The July 2026 draft allocates taxing rights over fees for services and income from automated digital services. In each case the residence state may tax, and the source state may also tax on a gross basis. For fees, the source is determined by a cascade: where services are physically performed, failing that where the consumer resides, failing that where the payer resides or claims a deduction [5, Article 5]. Automated digital services are defined as services "requiring minimal human involvement from the service provider" [5, Article 6]. The central number, the maximum source-state rate, appears as "[ ] per cent" in both articles [5, Articles 5-6].
That blank is the protocol. A low cap would make it a modest withholding regime. A high cap, without a net-basis option, would raise the risk of double taxation that business groups and residence states warn about. The draft offers taxpayers a route to net-basis taxation where they carry on business in the source state or elect it [5, Article 5, paragraph 4]. The secondary summary of the fifth session reports that nexus rules, the role of physical presence and the degree of flexibility for participating States were all debated without resolution [19].
Protocol II on disputes. The draft dispute protocol is the longest of the three texts, with detailed provisions on bilateral and multilateral advance pricing arrangements and related mechanisms [6]. Its definitions are drafted to operate on top of "any bilateral agreement, multilateral convention, protocol... or any other instrument in force between two or more Parties that establishes rules for the allocation of taxing rights" [6, Chapter I]. Dispute prevention is the area where developing and capital-exporting States may share the most interest. Tax certainty is a core demand of business, and long mutual-agreement procedures cost revenue authorities with few staff. Its choice as Protocol II may yet prove to be the process's most pragmatic decision.
Table 2. Status of the three instruments as of 11 November 2026
| Instrument | Latest public draft | Key unresolved element visible in text | On Nairobi agenda | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Framework Convention | Zero draft, CRP.32, 21 July 2026; revised draft to be presented at session | Entry-into-force threshold blank; exchange-of-information article bracketed; alignment duty for existing treaties | Yes, days 1-7 | [4]; [3] |
| Protocol I, cross-border services | Draft, CRP.33, 20 July 2026 | Maximum source-state rate blank for fees and automated digital services | No | [5]; [3] |
| Protocol II, dispute prevention and resolution | Draft, CRP.34, 20 July 2026; revised draft to be presented at session | Time limits in brackets (for example "[within xx days]") | Yes, days 8-9 | [6]; [3] |
n/a: revised texts for Nairobi had not been located in public form at the time of writing.
5. The calendar: less time than it appears
The General Assembly asked for at least three sessions a year in 2025, 2026 and 2027 [7, paragraph 4]. The committee's published schedule shows nine substantive sessions, from New York in August 2025 to New York in July 2027, with Nairobi hosting the third and sixth [1].
Table 3. Substantive sessions of the negotiating committee, published schedule
| Session | Dates | Place | Status at 11 November 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| First | 4-8 August 2025 | New York | Held |
| Second | 11-15 August 2025 | New York | Held |
| Third | 10-19 November 2025 | Nairobi | Held |
| Fourth | 2-3 and 5-13 February 2026 | New York | Held |
| Fifth | 3-13 August 2026 | New York | Held |
| Sixth | 30 November-10 December 2026 | Nairobi | Scheduled |
| Seventh | 18-29 January 2027 | New York [2] | Scheduled |
| Eighth | 26 April-7 May 2027 | n/a (not stated on schedule) | Scheduled |
| Ninth | 19-30 July 2027 | n/a (not stated on schedule) | Scheduled |
Source: UN DESA Financing for Sustainable Development Office, INC key dates [1]; organisational session of 3-6 February 2025 not counted as substantive [9]. The sixth-session page notes eligible entities may register for the sixth session in Nairobi and the seventh in New York [2].
Counting Nairobi, only four substantive sessions remain before texts are due. The first full drafts appeared only in July 2026, roughly halfway through the mandate. The Nairobi programme gives seven working days to the Framework Convention and two to Protocol II, with closed meetings on several afternoons [3]. Protocol I is absent from the Nairobi programme. That may reflect sequencing rather than difficulty. It still means the most commercially sensitive text will reach 2027 with its rate unwritten.
The timetable creates two risks. One is that the committee delivers a framework text that is mostly principles, with protocols far behind. The other is that pressure to finish leads to more use of the two-thirds rule on protocols. That would speed adoption but weaken the instrument's value for the States whose ratification would make it matter.
6. The parallel track: the OECD system did not stand still
The UN negotiations are often described as a challenge to the OECD-led order. The evidence of 2025 and 2026 suggests a more complicated relationship. The OECD system has adapted, and the UN process has been careful not to declare it illegitimate.
On 5 January 2026 the OECD announced that the 147 members of the Inclusive Framework had agreed a "side-by-side" package for the global minimum tax [16]. The package includes simplification measures, a new substance-based tax-incentive safe harbour, and safe harbours for groups whose ultimate parent is in an eligible jurisdiction with minimum taxation requirements. It also includes an evidence-based stocktake and a reaffirmation that qualified domestic minimum top-up taxes remain a primary mechanism [16]. The package document states that the stocktake is to be concluded by 2029 [17, section 4.1]. In substance, the package allows qualifying pre-existing regimes in eligible jurisdictions to be recognised as operating alongside the Pillar Two rules, while all groups remain subject to qualified domestic minimum top-up taxes where those apply [17, paragraphs 17-19].
For the UN process, this cuts two ways. It shows that the Inclusive Framework can still produce agreement among a broad membership, which weakens the claim that the OECD route is exhausted. It also shows that jurisdictions with existing regimes of their own can negotiate recognition for them inside that forum. Supporters of the UN process read accommodations of this kind as evidence of the asymmetry that motivated the push for UN rule-making.
The Sevilla Commitment, adopted at the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in mid-2025, records both tracks in a single paragraph. Signatories "will continue to engage constructively in the negotiations" on the UN Framework Convention and "encourage support for the process". The same paragraph "recognize[s] the ongoing implementation of Pillar Two" and calls for technical support [15, paragraph 28(b) and (d)]. The draft Convention's instruction to the future Conference of the Parties to "take into consideration the work of other relevant forums" [4, Article 13] follows the same logic. It points to coexistence, not replacement.
7. Strongest objections
Objection 1: without the United States, the convention is irrelevant
The United States told the organisational session that the Convention's goals were "inconsistent with U.S. priorities", that it would not participate further, and that it "intends to reject the outcomes... and oppose them" [11]. Since much cross-border corporate income is earned by US-headquartered groups, a convention without the United States cannot reallocate that income on its own.
This objection is strong on the Convention's direct effect on US taxpayers. It is weaker on the Convention's effect among its Parties. A framework convention binds those who ratify it. If enough source States adopted Protocol I, they would coordinate their own taxation of payments flowing out of their jurisdictions. They would do so under a common rulebook rather than through unilateral digital services taxes. The open question is whether such coordination would lower or raise tensions with non-Parties. The draft texts do not answer it.
Objection 2: majority voting will produce a treaty that the main capital exporters will not ratify
The votes in Table 1 are a warning. Eight States voted against the terms of reference, and one of them, the United States, has since left the process [8, paragraph 40; 11]. If protocols are adopted by two-thirds majority over their objections, they may simply not join. Each Party has the option whether to become party to any protocol [8, annex I, paragraph 14].
This is the most serious structural objection. It is partly answered by design. Decision 4 makes majority voting a fallback after good-faith consensus efforts, and the opt-in structure means no State is bound by a protocol it rejects [9, paragraph 25; 8, annex I, paragraph 14]. But opt-in cuts both ways. A protocol joined only by net capital importers would coordinate claims among them without securing agreement from the residence States that would have to give relief from double taxation.
Objection 3: the drafts are too weak to change anything
Read strictly, many of the Framework Convention's commitments are duties to "cooperate", "explore", "share general information" or "report" [4, Articles 5, 6, 21]. Critics in favour of the process may see this as the price of dilution. Critics opposed to it may see a treaty that duplicates existing cooperation at extra cost.
The answer depends on institutions, not verbs. Framework conventions acquire force through their Conferences of the Parties, review mechanisms and later protocols. The draft would give the Conference power to adopt protocols and to review implementation [4, Articles 13, 16, 20]. Whether this grows into a serious tax-policy forum depends on its decision rules and resources. Those are exactly the questions the fifth session left open [19].
Objection 4: the UN lacks the technical capacity for detailed tax rules
The OECD has a large tax secretariat and decades of technical work. The UN's tax work has been carried by a small office and an expert committee. The draft dispute protocol's length and detail [6] show that UN negotiators can produce technical text. Sustaining it would require funding and staff that the drafts mention only in general terms [4, Articles 17-18]. In a period of severe UN budget pressure, this objection deserves weight. The terms of reference ask the Secretary-General to provide "necessary facilities and resources" [8, annex I, paragraph 23]. They do not say where the money will come from.
8. What would count as progress in Nairobi
Nairobi will not finish the Convention. Its value will lie in whether it narrows the issues that the 2027 sessions must settle. Meridian proposes the following observable tests, each answerable from the session's documents.
- Treaty alignment clause. Does the revised draft keep a duty to align existing treaties and to negotiate renegotiation requests "in good faith and without undue delay" [4, Article 21]? Or is it reduced to a non-binding aspiration? This is the clearest indicator of whether the Convention will reach into existing bilateral networks.
- Exchange of information. Does the bracketed exchange-of-information article survive, and which relevance standard is chosen [4, Article 11]?
- Conference of the Parties. Are decision rules and the scope of the Conference's authority specified, and do they include any majority voting?
- Entry-into-force threshold. Is a number proposed for Article 26 [4]? A low threshold signals intent to bring the treaty into force among a willing group. A high one signals a search for breadth.
- Protocol II time limits. Are the bracketed deadlines in the dispute protocol filled [6]? Concrete time limits would be the first hard numbers in any of the three texts.
- Use of Decision 4. Does the Chair declare consensus exhausted on any matter? A first vote on substance would mark a change in the character of the negotiations [9, paragraph 25].
- Protocol I sequencing. Is a date or process announced for returning to the services protocol and its rate [5; 3]?
None of these requires predicting a final outcome. Together they show whether the committee is moving from principle to obligation, or managing an expanding set of brackets towards a deadline.
9. Conclusion
The UN tax negotiations have moved from a contested idea to an actual text in under four years, and they have done so by majority vote. That origin explains both their momentum and their limits. The drafts on the table in late 2026 state, more clearly than any previous multilateral text, the principle that market and source jurisdictions deserve a fairer share of taxing rights. They also leave the decisive numbers blank and phrase most obligations as cooperation.
The most likely near-term result is not a new global tax order. It is a framework treaty that sits alongside a still-functioning OECD system, with a dispute protocol that could attract broad support and a services protocol whose rate will decide its reach. For governments outside the negotiations, the useful question is not whether the UN convention replaces existing rules. It is which clauses, if adopted by a large group of source States, would change how those States tax payments leaving their borders. Nairobi will show whether the committee is ready to write those clauses down.
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