Since the fall of the Assad government in December 2024, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has moved from more than a decade of obstruction in Syria to field access, new declarations and, in August 2026, the first verified destruction of Syrian chemical munitions since 2014. Yet 19 of the 26 outstanding issues in Syria's 2013 declaration remain open, over 100 further locations may have been involved in the programme, and the OPCW itself is short of cash. This paper reads the Director-General's monthly reports, the Executive Council's decisions and Security Council records to separate what has been verified from what has only been found, and sets tests for the Conference of the States Parties that opens on 23 November 2026.
Key findings and scope
- Of 26 outstanding issues identified in the Assad government's initial declaration of 23 October 2013, seven have been resolved. None of those seven was resolved after December 2024. The 19 that remain "include potentially large quantities of undeclared and/or unverified chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions" [1, paragraph 10; 4, paragraph 16].
- In addition to 26 declared chemical weapons-related locations, information available to the Technical Secretariat indicates that "over 100 additional locations may have been involved" [4, paragraph 17]. By February 2026 the Secretariat had visited more than 20 locations [6].
- A May 2026 deployment found more than 600 kg of an undeclared chemical linked to nerve-agent production and several dozen undeclared, unfilled chemical munitions [4, paragraphs 25-27]. Syria then amended its declaration in June 2026, declaring an additional production facility, a newly discovered chemical used in nerve-agent production (hexamine), Category 3 chemical weapons and two storage facilities [1, paragraphs 4-5].
- In August 2026 the Secretariat verified the destruction of 42 declared, unfilled chemical aerial bombs at Al Qutayfah. The UN's disarmament chief told the Security Council this was the first verified destruction of Syrian chemical munitions since 2014 [1, paragraph 7; 16].
- The Executive Council reinstated Syria's suspended rights and privileges under the Convention on 9 July 2026, under authority delegated by the Conference in November 2025. The Director-General's reports state that Syria has still "not completed any" of the three measures demanded of it in 2020 [10; 9; 1, annex, paragraph 14].
- The OPCW reported in October 2026 that it had received less than 65 per cent of 2026 assessed contributions and had fully drawn down its Working Capital Fund. The Director-General warned that Syria deployments could be curtailed if the situation did not improve [12].
This paper relies on OPCW official-series documents, the Chemical Weapons Convention and Security Council records available on 11 November 2026. Monthly reports by the Director-General are the main evidence for field activity. Where Syria, other States or UN officials characterise progress, the paper attributes the characterisation. The paper does not assess the accuracy of intelligence about undeclared sites, which is not public. It does not reproduce leaked or unattributed claims about specific stockpiles. The full series of monthly reports is listed on the OPCW's Syria documents page [20].
1. A file reopened by regime change
Syria acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention on 14 September 2013, and the Convention entered into force for it on 14 October 2013 [1, paragraph 2]. Its accession followed the chemical attacks in Ghouta that August [16] and was locked in by Security Council resolution 2118 of 27 September 2013. That resolution decided that Syria "shall not use, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons". It encouraged Member States to support the elimination effort and provided that non-compliance would lead the Council to impose measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter [14, paragraphs 4, 10, 21].
In the year that followed, a joint OPCW-UN mission removed the chemicals Syria declared, and they were destroyed outside its territory [19]. The OPCW's reports still state that all chemicals removed in 2014 have been destroyed [1, annex, paragraph 9]. The Secretariat also verified the destruction of all 27 production facilities Syria declared at the time [4, paragraph 13(a)].
But the declaration was never accepted as complete. Over twelve years the Secretariat found "numerous gaps, discrepancies, and inconsistencies" and compelled the former authorities to make 20 amendments [4, paragraphs 9, 36]. OPCW investigators meanwhile attributed several attacks to Syrian government forces [18]. In 2020 the Executive Council required Syria to declare the facilities behind the March 2017 attacks, declare all chemical weapons it held and resolve all outstanding issues within 90 days [1, annex, paragraph 10]. When it failed to do so, the Conference used Article XII of the Convention in April 2021 to suspend several of Syria's rights and privileges [1, annex, paragraphs 11-13]. Article XII allows the Conference, on the Council's recommendation, to "restrict or suspend the State Party's rights and privileges" until it acts to conform with its obligations [15, Article XII, paragraph 2].
The fall of the former government on 8 December 2024 changed the operating conditions, not the law. The Secretariat's position is that "all legal obligations binding upon the Syrian Arab Republic as a State Party to the Convention remain valid, regardless of any change in government" [4, paragraph 10]. What changed was access.
2. From obstruction to access: what the record shows
The Executive Council's October 2025 decision describes the new situation as an opportunity "after more than 11 years of obstruction from the former Syrian regime". It records a privileges-and-immunities agreement in force from 16 June 2025 and Syrian cooperation including "unfettered access to sites and personnel, expedited visa issuance, and operational security support" [8, preamble]. The decision was submitted by Qatar [9, preamble].
The Secretariat's monthly reports allow the pace of fieldwork to be traced.
- 2025. Teams deployed from March 2025. By October 2025, 13 of the additional locations had been visited, during deployments in March, April and August [7, paragraph 17].
- Early 2026. By February 2026, more than 20 locations had been visited and over 6,000 documents collected. On 15 January 2026 the Syrian authorities handed over 34 sealed boxes of documents [6, paragraphs 20-21; 5, paragraph 21]. By March, documents from Syrian authorities amounted to about 50,000 pages, all requiring registration and analysis. The Secretariat assessed that at least four visited locations "could be declarable" [5, paragraphs 20-22].
- A pause. OPCW activities in Syria were "temporarily suspended on 17 March 2026" after a deterioration in regional security and resumed at the end of April [4, paragraph 21]. The Security Council was told in March that further visits were on hold "given the conflict in the region" [17].
- May 2026. A three-week deployment visited seven suspected locations and one storage site and collected 22 samples. It found more than 600 kg of an undeclared chemical linked to nerve-agent production, several dozen undeclared unfilled aerial bombs and rockets, a launching system for the rockets, mixing units for aerial bombs and large quantities of documents [4, paragraphs 23-27].
- June-October 2026. Syria amended its declaration, two storage-facility agreements and a verification plan were approved, and destruction began [3, paragraphs 11-17; 1, paragraphs 4-7]. Over 100 bags of documents were gathered from locations visited in May [2, paragraph 13].
The documentary haul matters as much as the munitions. The 19 outstanding issues concern what the former programme produced and what became of it. Records are the main route to answering those questions when those who ran the programme are absent or unwilling to talk. The Council has noted Syria's grant of access to "tens of thousands of documents" [10, preamble]. Reading them is slow work. In October 2026 the Secretariat reported that it had only just "finalised the triage and scanning of all recently collected documents" [1, paragraph 11].
3. What has been verified, and what has only been found
The distinction between discovery and verified elimination runs through the OPCW's own reporting. It is easily lost in headlines.
Verified destruction. The August 2026 inspection verified the destruction of 42 declared, unfilled chemical aerial bombs at the Al Qutayfah destruction facility. Samples from the remaining bombs were awaiting analysis before their destruction [1, paragraph 7]. Under the Convention, unfilled munitions and equipment designed for chemical weapons use are Category 3 chemical weapons [15, Verification Annex, Part IV(A), paragraph 16]. Their destruction is a real legal step. It is not the same as destroying agent.
Declared and stored, not yet destroyed. The newly declared chemical, hexamine, and the rest of the munitions are held at the declared Al Qutayfah and Homs storage facilities "while awaiting destruction" [1, paragraph 5]. An initial inspection of one of the newly declared storage facilities took place in August 2026 [1, paragraph 6].
Lost before verification. In January 2026 Syrian authorities and the Secretariat visited an Aleppo-area site to assess storage containers and 75 undeclared cylinders. The cylinders were no longer present; pieces that may have come from them were seen at a scrapyard [17; 5, paragraph 19]. A Syrian internal investigation, delivered on 30 June 2026, found the incident "more likely to have resulted from negligence and institutional deficiencies rather than from an intentional or planned act" [2, paragraph 12]. Analysis of liner remnants confirmed the chemical they had absorbed was the same chemical the Syrian authorities said had been stored in them. Samples from the site's 20,000-litre containers showed no scheduled chemicals [2, paragraph 15]. The episode shows the limits of verification after the fact. A loss can be explained, but what was lost cannot be inventoried.
Unresolved. The 19 outstanding issues remain open [1, paragraph 10]. Syria's monthly national reports continue, but they arrive with a lag. The latest, dated 1 October 2026, covered 15 August to 15 September [1, paragraph 8].
Table 1. Key steps in the Syrian chemical weapons file since December 2024
| Date | Step | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8 December 2024 | Fall of the former government | Council remains seized of the matter | [8, preamble] |
| 16 June 2025 | Privileges and immunities agreement in force | In force | [8, preamble] |
| 8 October 2025 | Council decision EC-110/DEC.1 on expedited on-site destruction in exceptional cases | Adopted; arrangements still under discussion in September 2026 | [8]; [2, paragraph 18] |
| 28 November 2025 | Conference delegates to the Council authority to reinstate Syria's rights (C-30/DEC.8) | Adopted; "does not create any precedent" | [9] |
| 17 March to end-April 2026 | OPCW activities in Syria suspended for security reasons | Resumed | [4, paragraph 21] |
| 5-26 May 2026 | Deployment finds undeclared chemical and munitions | Items sealed and stored | [4, paragraphs 23-27] |
| 15-22 June 2026 | Syria amends initial declaration | Evaluated by Secretariat, note verbale of 17 July 2026 | [3, paragraph 11] |
| 8 July 2026 | Council approves storage facility agreements and verification plan | Approved | [3, paragraphs 13-15] |
| 9 July 2026 | Council reinstates Syria's rights and privileges (EC-112/DEC.7) | Adopted | [10] |
| August 2026 | Verified destruction of 42 unfilled aerial bombs | Verified | [1, paragraph 7] |
| 12-14 October 2026 | Director-General visits Syria | Held | [1, paragraph 19] |
| 23-27 November 2026 | Thirty-First Session of the Conference of the States Parties | Scheduled | [13] |
n/a: no date has been published for the destruction of the remaining declared munitions or the hexamine.
4. Reinstatement before completion
The most consequential political decision of 2026 was the Council's choice to restore Syria's rights and privileges before the verification task was finished.
The legal path was unusual. The Conference's 2021 decision said the suspended rights would be restored once the Director-General reported that Syria had completed the measures set in 2020 [1, annex, paragraph 14]. Those measures have not been completed. Each monthly report still says so in terms [1, annex, paragraph 14]. In November 2025 the Conference therefore delegated to the Council the authority to decide on reinstatement "taking into account any progress made". It added that the decision "does not create any precedent for the future" [9, paragraphs 1-2]. In July 2026 the Council used that authority. It welcomed amendments to the declaration, facility agreements, facilitation of verification and "initial steps towards the destruction of identified remnants". It recognised "that this progress constitutes the basis upon which the Council has determined that the reinstatement of rights and privileges is appropriate at this time" [10, paragraphs 1-2].
The decision rests on a distinction between two Syrias. The sanction was imposed on a government that used chemical weapons and obstructed inspectors. The rights were restored to a successor government that is cooperating but has not yet been able to finish the work. That reasoning is defensible. It also changes the incentive structure. The main formal lever available to the OPCW policy-making organs, suspension under Article XII, has been spent. Continued cooperation now rests on Syria's own interest, on assistance, and on the Council's continuing scrutiny through the monthly reports [10, paragraph 3]. At its October 2026 session the Council noted three of those reports and three national papers submitted by Syria [11, paragraphs 6.15-6.16].
5. The money and the means
Verification in a post-war country costs money that the OPCW's regular budget was never designed to provide. The Director-General's reports track both the voluntary Trust Fund for Syria Missions and the estimated requirements.
Table 2. Funding for OPCW activities in Syria, as reported in successive monthly reports (EUR million)
| Report (date) | Trust Fund contributions and pledges since inception | Additional funding estimated as required | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| EC-111/DG.1 (23 October 2025) | 58.47 | 6.4 for 2026; 12.5 for 2027 | [7] |
| EC-111/DG.10 (24 February 2026) | 64 | 1.2 for 2026; 12.5 for 2027 | [6] |
| EC-112/DG.2 (24 March 2026) | 65.2 | 0.1 for 2026; 12.5 for 2027 | [5] |
| EC-112/DG.19 (29 June 2026) | 65.5 | 2026 expected to be covered; 12.3 required for 2027 | [4] |
| EC-113/DG.6 (24 August 2026) | 66.4 | None projected after revision of requirements | [3] |
| EC-114/DG.1 (26 October 2026) | 66.6 | None projected for 2026 and 2027, "based on current information" | [1] |
Note: the Trust Fund totals exclude the more than EUR 48 million received in 2013 and 2014 for destruction of the chemicals removed from Syria [1, paragraph 25]. Requirements for 2026 and 2027 were revised to EUR 9.1 million and EUR 11.3 million respectively [1, paragraph 26].
The table tells a qualified success story. Pledges rose by about EUR 8 million in a year, and the projected gap closed. It closed partly because requirements were revised and because EUR 3.01 million is proposed to be covered by a partial reallocation of the OPCW's 2024 cash surplus, not only because donors paid [1, paragraph 26]. The OPCW's wider finances are weaker. The Director-General told the Council on 6 October 2026 that, more than three-quarters through the year, less than 65 per cent of 2026 assessed contributions had arrived. The Working Capital Fund had been fully drawn down, and the Organisation "may have to curtail core activities... including in relation to Syria deployments" [12].
Means matter as much as money. A Secretariat needs-and-gaps assessment, circulated in November 2025, listed equipment for safe access and team protection, expertise, training to avoid incidents and breaks in chain of custody, and minimum operational requirements for deployment and expedited destruction [1, paragraphs 20-21]. At the Security Council in March 2026, a non-governmental briefer stressed that many sites were bombed and littered with unexploded ordnance, which inspectors cannot safely cross without clearance [17]. Bilateral help is significant. The United Kingdom told the Council in September 2026 that it had contributed over US$4.7 million to the Trust Fund since December 2024 and nearly US$9.5 million in bilateral funding for Syrian-led destruction [16].
6. Accountability alongside disarmament
The OPCW's Syria work has always had two tracks: eliminating the programme and establishing responsibility for its use. The new access has advanced both.
In January 2026 the OPCW's Investigation and Identification Team published its fifth report. It concluded there were reasonable grounds to believe that the Syrian Arab Air Force carried out a chlorine attack in Kafr Zeita on 1 October 2016, injuring 35 named people. The OPCW described this as the first investigation with which Syria cooperated. Five reports have now identified perpetrators in seven cases [18]. Investigations into chlorine attacks in Al-Tamanah and Kafr Zeita in April 2014 continue, informed by site visits and digital material collected in 2026 [1, paragraph 17; 2, paragraph 22]. The Secretariat continues to pass information to the UN's International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria, most recently on 16 July 2026 [1, paragraph 18].
Syria's representative told the Security Council in September 2026 that the country was preparing to hold its first court hearing on chemical weapons use [16]. The Council's 2025 decision on expedited destruction explicitly requires methods that preserve "evidence related to the use of chemical weapons" [8, paragraph 4]. That clause is a reminder that speed and accountability can pull against each other. Destroying items on site quickly reduces hazard. It can also destroy evidence.
7. Strongest objections
Objection 1: the Technical Secretariat is politicised, so its findings should not drive decisions
Russia told the Security Council in September 2026 that the Secretariat had "politicized the issue" by focusing on accusing the former government. China said the accountability functions of "highly controversial" investigative teams exceeded the Convention's mandate [16]. In March, Russia dismissed the latest attribution report as unsupported by evidence [17].
These objections are long-standing and predate the change of government. They carry less weight now that the State whose conduct is being examined is cooperating with the investigations and has itself welcomed the destruction work [16; 18]. The attribution method rests on a stated "reasonable grounds" standard and on multiple sources of evidence [18]. Disagreement about the Secretariat's mandate is a legitimate legal debate. It does not make its counts of munitions destroyed or issues resolved unreliable.
Objection 2: reinstating Syria's rights was premature
Critics can point to the text. The measures set in 2020 are still incomplete, and 19 issues remain open [1, annex, paragraph 14; 1, paragraph 10]. On this view the Council gave away leverage for goodwill.
The counter-argument is that the leverage was aimed at a government that no longer exists. Keeping sanctions on its successor would punish cooperation. The Conference also labelled the delegation of authority as without precedent [9, paragraph 2]. The objection is strongest as a warning about the future. If cooperation falters, the policy-making organs will have few formal tools left short of referral to the Security Council under Article XII, paragraph 4 [15].
Objection 3: the numbers flatter progress
Forty-two unfilled bombs are a small fraction of what the 19 outstanding issues may involve. None of the seven resolved issues was closed after December 2024 [4, paragraph 16]. "Over 100" further locations is a lower bound, and the latest visit count published in the reports used here is "more than 20" locations, from early 2026 [6; 5; 4, paragraph 17].
This is fair, and this paper's figure is designed to make it visible. But progress in verification is non-linear. Documents found in 2026 may resolve several issues at once once they are analysed. The Director-General has set a concrete near-term aim: assess "as many of the unvisited priority sites as possible before the end of the year" [12]. That can be checked.
Objection 4: external military action makes verification impossible
The Council's 2025 decision lists "the impact of air strikes, including those targeting suspected sites" among the challenges [8, preamble]. At the Security Council in September 2026, Türkiye warned that strikes on potentially relevant sites risk releasing hazardous materials and destroying evidence, and Pakistan said military strikes against Syrian sites and facilities complicate the work [16]. Regional conflict halted OPCW activity for about six weeks in 2026 [4, paragraph 21].
The objection is correct that security conditions set the pace. It does not follow that verification is impossible. Fieldwork resumed after the pause, and the largest discoveries came afterwards [4, paragraphs 21-27]. The real risk is gradual loss: sites damaged, evidence degraded and inventories that can never be reconstructed. The 75 cylinders show that risk in miniature [2, paragraph 12].
8. Tests for the Conference and beyond
The Thirty-First Session of the Conference meets in The Hague from 23 to 27 November 2026. Its agenda lists the full run of monthly Syria reports and the reinstatement decisions [13, paragraphs 9.5-9.7]. The next Council session is scheduled for 16-19 March 2027 [1, header]. Meridian suggests the following observable tests, each answerable from OPCW documents.
- Outstanding issues. Does the count of resolved issues move above seven for the first time since 2024 [1, paragraph 10]?
- Destruction of the remaining Category 3 items and the hexamine. Are dates and verification results reported [1, paragraphs 5, 7]?
- Site coverage. Does the Secretariat publish an updated count of locations visited against the "over 100" baseline [4, paragraph 17]?
- Expedited destruction. Are arrangements under EC-110/DEC.1 finalised, and do they include evidence preservation as the decision requires [8, paragraph 4; 2, paragraph 18]?
- Finance. Does the Conference act on arrears in assessed contributions, and is any Syria deployment curtailed for lack of cash [12]?
- Accountability. Are further attribution findings or transfers to the international mechanism reported [1, paragraphs 17-18]?
9. Conclusion
Syria's chemical weapons file has changed more in the past two years than in the previous ten. Access has replaced obstruction. Declarations are being amended by a government that says it is a victim of the programme it inherited, not its author. For the first time in more than a decade, munitions have been destroyed under international verification on Syrian soil.
The verified core remains small. Seven of 26 issues resolved, all before December 2024. Forty-two unfilled bombs destroyed. A chemical and munitions stored but not yet eliminated. Over 100 locations still to assess, with an Organisation that is short of cash. The question for the coming year is not whether Syria is cooperating. The OPCW's own reports say it is. The question is whether cooperation can be turned into closure of the outstanding issues before evidence decays, donors tire or security fails. That will be measured in documents analysed and issues closed, not in statements welcoming progress.
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