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Research Paper

Drought Deferred: Land, Rangelands and the Road from Ulaanbaatar to COP18

MER/26/D22 · Meridian Research Team ·

Drought Deferred: Land, Rangelands and the Road from Ulaanbaatar to COP18

The seventeenth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, held in Ulaanbaatar from 17 to 28 August 2026, placed rangelands at the centre of the agenda and advanced a finance and partnership package for land restoration and drought resilience. It did not conclude a global drought instrument. Parties decided to continue discussions at COP18 with a view to adopting a decision on proactive drought management at all levels, and to keep drought as a stand-alone agenda item thereafter. This paper distinguishes adopted process decisions from announced finance, reads the drought track against the Convention's mandate, and sets tests for whether Egypt's COP18 presidency inherits architecture or unfinished bargaining.

Key findings and scope

  • UNCCD COP17 brought together the Convention's 197 Parties in Ulaanbaatar. The Secretariat's closing press release presents the meeting as an implementation-focused COP centred on rangelands, which cover 54 per cent of the Earth's land surface, support around two billion people and are stewarded by some 500 million pastoralists [1].
  • Parties decided to continue drought discussions at COP18, building on progress at COP16 and COP17, with a view to adopting a decision on proactive drought management at all levels, and to include drought as a stand-alone agenda item at COP18 and each ordinary session thereafter [1; 2].
  • Governments, development banks, funds and companies announced a US$1.3 billion portfolio of finance across 23 countries, including US$644.5 million identified as new finance, of which US$216.4 million is described as already confirmed and moving toward implementation. A Rangelands Flagship Initiative is presented as US$1.2 billion across 45 projects [1].
  • The Drought Resilience Investment Facility, launched by UNCCD and Luxembourg, aims to mobilise up to US$400 million in public and private capital. The Riyadh Global Drought Resilience Partnership advanced work on a proposed pooled fund intended to help around 70 low- and lower-middle-income countries [1].
  • Draft decision ICCD/COP(17)/L.15 shows that at COP16 Parties had still been debating bracketed options for a global framework or protocol and for a legally binding or non-legally binding instrument. COP17's adopted path continues the discussion rather than selecting among those brackets [2].

Finance figures below are Secretariat-reported announcements and portfolio labels. They are not audited disbursements. Bracketed COP16 annex text is evidence of unresolved design choices, not of an adopted instrument. COP18 is expected in Egypt in 2028 according to the Secretariat press release [1].

1. The Convention's drought problem

The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification is the global land convention among the Rio instruments. Drought has long sat inside its mandate, yet Parties have repeatedly struggled to agree whether proactive drought management requires a new dedicated instrument, stronger guidance under existing decisions, or primarily finance and capacity measures. COP16 in Riyadh elevated drought politically, including through the Riyadh Political Declaration and the launch of the Riyadh Global Drought Resilience Partnership [1; 2]. COP17 was therefore never only a rangelands showcase. It was the first full test of whether that political elevation would convert into an agreed legal or institutional form.

It did not, fully. It did convert into a procedural commitment: drought remains unavoidable on the COP agenda, and COP18 is charged with working toward a decision on proactive management at all levels [1; 2]. That is more than silence and less than a protocol.

COP17 land/drought finance labels (US$ million)Portfolio (23 countries)1300of which new finance644.5of which confirmed216.4Rangelands flagship1200
Figure 1. Finance figures reported by the UNCCD Secretariat at the close of COP 17, in US$ million. The rangelands flagship (US$1.2 billion across 45 projects) is a related initiative portfolio and is not additive to the US$1.3 billion 23-country portfolio. “Up to US$400 million” for the Drought Resilience Investment Facility is a mobilisation aim and is not plotted as secured capital. Source: UNCCD COP17 press release, 28 August 2026 [1]. Chart drawn by Meridian from the published figures.

2. What Ulaanbaatar decided on drought

Draft decision ICCD/COP(17)/L.15, submitted by the Chair of the Committee of the Whole, decides to continue discussions at the eighteenth session based on progress at COP16 (annexed to decision 24/COP.16) and progress at COP17 (annexed to the decision), with a view to adopting a decision on proactive drought management at all levels. It also decides that drought will be a stand-alone agenda item at COP18 and at each ordinary session thereafter, and requests the secretariat and the Global Mechanism to continue support and to hold participatory consultations, subject to available resources, including in parallel with CRIC 25 [2, operative paragraphs 1-4].

Annex I to L.15 reproduces non-consensus progress from COP16, including still-bracketed language on launching a process toward a global framework/protocol/instrument and on whether that instrument would be legally binding [2, Annex I]. Annex II is the COP17 progress vehicle. The political meaning of the adopted operative paragraphs is therefore double-edged. Parties refused to let drought slip back into a secondary theme. They also refused, in Ulaanbaatar, to close the instrument question. Meridian's assessment is that this outcome should be reported as structured deferral with agenda protection, not as either collapse or completion.

The Secretariat press release aligns with that reading: discussions continue at COP18; drought remains a stand-alone item; the Riyadh Partnership moved toward implementation through a first Assembly of Partners working on a proposed pooled fund [1]. Proposed is the decisive adjective for the fund.

3. Rangelands as the political centre of gravity

COP17 coincided with the International Year of Rangelands and Pastoralists. The Secretariat reports launch of a Rangelands Flagship Initiative bringing together US$1.2 billion across 45 projects, described as the largest single mobilisation for rangelands in the Convention's history, and presents Mongolia's "Steppe Plan" initiatives on rangelands, the water-land nexus and nature-based solutions for sustainable infrastructure [1]. Decision 20/COP.17 on rangelands and pastoralists appears among the listed COP17 decisions on the Convention decisions portal [3].

Centering rangelands is analytically justified by the land share and livelihood figures the Secretariat advances: 54 per cent of land surface, around two billion people supported, some 500 million pastoralists [1]. It is also politically convenient. Rangelands offer a tangible implementation narrative while the drought-instrument negotiation remains unfinished. The risk is substitution: celebrating flagship portfolios while postponing rules that would discipline proactive drought management across all ecosystems. The opportunity is integration: using rangeland finance and pastoralist participation to demonstrate what proactive management looks like in practice before COP18 debates legal form again.

4. Finance: announcements, confirmation and the meaning of "up to"

Table 1. Finance figures reported at COP17 and how to read them

Figure What the Secretariat says Analytical status
US$1.3 billion Portfolio across 23 countries on five continents Announced portfolio at different stages of development
US$644.5 million Identified as new finance Labelled "new"; not the same as disbursed
US$216.4 million Already confirmed and moving toward implementation Stronger than announcement; still not evaluated outcome
US$1.2 billion / 45 projects Rangelands Flagship Initiative Initiative portfolio, not a single new cash window
Up to US$400 million Drought Resilience Investment Facility aim Mobilisation target ("up to"), not committed capital in hand
~70 countries Intended reach of proposed Riyadh Partnership pooled fund Proposed fund design, not enrolments completed

Source: UNCCD COP17 closing press release [1]. Meridian does not convert "up to" or "proposed" into realised totals.

The Executive Secretary's own closing warning, quoted by the Secretariat, is that Ulaanbaatar will not be judged by what was announced inside the conference but by whether countries are better prepared for drought, whether land and rangelands are restored, whether finance reaches viable projects, and whether land managers see a difference [1]. That standard is the correct one. It also implies that this paper cannot yet score COP17 as a finance success on outcomes. It can score COP17 as having thickened the pipeline narrative and created or advanced vehicles (DRIF, Riyadh Partnership assembly, flagship initiative) whose delivery must be tracked.

complementary detail in the press package: more than 70 countries now have national drought plans, compared with only three in 2013, yet financing and implementation continue to lag [1]. Plans without money are a recurring land-convention failure mode. DRIF's claim to be the first global catalytic financing platform dedicated to drought resilience is therefore institutionally notable even before its mobilisation target is tested [1].

5. Land Degradation Neutrality and evidence presented in Ulaanbaatar

Brazil presented a voluntary 2030 Land Degradation Neutrality target comprising 17 sub-targets, including recovery or restoration of more than 163,000 km² (reported in the Secretariat package). Central Asian countries are reported to have adopted voluntary LDN targets, with half already met in aggregate terms used by the Secretariat [1]. Separately, scientific and assessment material presented in Ulaanbaatar is summarised as showing 18.8 million hectares of impact figures in one reported finding on rangelands or related degradation, alongside broader evidence on food, water and economic effects [1]. Meridian cites these as Secretariat-reported conference evidence. They support the claim that Parties were not debating in an evidence vacuum. They are not independently re-derived here.

COP17 also operated Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities Caucuses following COP16 decisions to establish those bodies, and highlighted women and youth leadership in land restoration discussions [1]. Participation architecture is part of implementation capacity. It does not replace an agreed drought decision.

6. Strongest objections

Objection 1: deferral is failure

The strongest critical case is that after Riyadh's political elevation, failure to agree a drought instrument in Ulaanbaatar shows the Convention cannot move from language to law. Bracketed COP16 text on binding versus non-binding form shows how deep the split remains [2]. The objection is fair as a judgement on legal ambition. It underrates agenda protection and partnership operationalisation as intermediate institutional facts. Whether deferral is failure depends on COP18. If Egypt inherits only repeated annexes, the criticism will have been vindicated.

Objection 2: finance announcements inflate success

A second objection is that multi-hundred-million headlines obscure the gap between portfolios, confirmed sums and disbursements. Table 1 accepts that objection as a methodological constraint. The US$216.4 million "confirmed" slice is the most credible near-term figure in the package; the US$400 million "up to" facility target is the softest [1]. Honest reporting must keep those tiers visible.

Objection 3: rangelands focus sidelines other drought geographies

Small Island Developing States and other drought-affected regions appear in the Secretariat's evidence narrative [1]. Even so, a host-driven rangelands frame could skew attention and finance. The counter is that rangelands had been under-attended relative to their land share. Both can be true. COP18's drought decision, if it comes, should be geographically general even if COP17's showcase was rangeland-heavy.

Objection 4: another investment facility adds clutter

Creating DRIF alongside the Riyadh Partnership and existing Global Mechanism channels risks fragmentation. The Secretariat presents DRIF as catalytic and dedicated [1]. Fragmentation is a real risk if countries face overlapping application costs. Complementarity will be shown by co-financing practice, not by logos.

6A. Science, index tools and the politics of measurement

Phase II of the International Drought Resilience Observatory introduced a Drought Resilience Index presented as a tool for countries to assess capacity to anticipate, prepare for and adapt to drought [1]. Measurement instruments matter in a Convention that has often struggled to convert narrative urgency into comparable planning. An index can help target finance and track preparedness. It can also become a substitute for contested legal commitments if Parties treat scoring exercises as sufficient ambition. Meridian's view is that the Index is a complement to, not a replacement for, the COP18 decision track protected in L.15 [2].

Scientific reports summarised in Ulaanbaatar on rangeland degradation, soil health and regional impacts supplied political oxygen for the host agenda [1]. Evidence-rich COPs can still fail on instrument design. COP17 used evidence effectively to frame rangelands and drought impacts; it did not use that evidence to close brackets on the form of a global drought instrument.

6B. Partnerships versus a protocol

The Riyadh Partnership, DRIF, the Rangelands Flagship Initiative and host-driven Steppe Plan initiatives collectively sketch a partnership-first strategy [1]. Partnership-first approaches can move money while legal talks stall. They can also fragment accountability if each vehicle reports to a different board with incompatible metrics. The Global Mechanism and secretariat are asked in L.15 to continue supporting Parties through existing tools and innovative mechanisms while consultations proceed [2, paragraph 3]. That instruction is a quiet admission that implementation cannot wait for perfect law, and that law remains unfinished.

For African and other drought-vulnerable Parties highlighted in the press package's call for capacity-building and technical cooperation [1], the near-term value of COP17 will be whether consultations and facilities reduce the cost of preparing bankable resilience projects. For the Convention's normative integrity, the near-term value will be whether COP18 text negotiations begin early enough to avoid another end-of-meeting improvisation.

6C. What "proactive management" has to mean if COP18 succeeds

Proactive drought management, as discussed across COP16 and COP17 materials, implies shifting from emergency response toward prevention, preparedness, sustainable land and water management, and coordinated action across climate, biodiversity and land agendas [2, Annex I]. If COP18 adopts a decision worthy of that phrase, it will need minimum operational content: national planning expectations, cooperation modalities, finance mobilisation hooks, and review arrangements. A decision that only restates concern would waste the agenda protection won in Ulaanbaatar. A decision that over-reaches into a heavily bracketed protocol without votes in the room would fail. The workable zone is a clear, implementable package that leaves some design details to subsidiary bodies without emptying the commitment.

7. Tests for the road to COP18

  1. Instrument choice: Does COP18 select among framework, protocol or alternative, and among binding and non-binding forms, or defer again?
  2. Fund operationalisation: Does the Riyadh Partnership pooled fund move from proposal to capitalisation and allocations to the intended country cohort?
  3. DRIF mobilisation: How much of the "up to US$400 million" is actually committed and deployed?
  4. Confirmed portfolio: Does the US$216.4 million confirmed slice grow, and is its implementation reported against land and drought metrics?
  5. Agenda discipline: Does stand-alone drought status produce negotiated text early in the COP18 cycle rather than another endgame crisis?

7A. Relationship to the other Rio conventions without collapsing them

Drought sits at the junction of land, climate and biodiversity. Annex I language in L.15 itself recognises links to climate change, biodiversity loss, water scarcity, deforestation, land degradation and sand and dust storms [2]. That recognition can justify synergistic projects. It can also become an excuse for venue-shifting: climate finance forums point to UNCCD, UNCCD points to climate funds, and land managers wait. COP17's finance vehicles are attempts to create land-and-drought-specific channels [1]. Their success should be judged on whether they shorten that waiting time. This paper deliberately does not re-litigate global emissions-gap analysis or biodiversity global-review findings handled in other Meridian publications; it asks only what UNCCD Parties did and deferred on drought and land in Ulaanbaatar.

7B. Host legacy and the Steppe Plan

Mongolia's presidency framed the meeting as a move from promises to implementation and secured political attention for the Steppe Plan's three initiatives [1]. Host legacies in environmental COPs often fade unless institutions and finance outlive the ceremonial fortnight. The Rangelands Flagship Initiative's reported scale makes that risk testable: 45 projects and a US$1.2 billion label either mature into contracted delivery or become a conference memory [1]. Tracking should distinguish host-country projects from the global portfolio and should report cancellations as openly as launches.

7C. Sand and dust storms, tenure and the wider COP17 acquis

COP17's decisions list is broader than drought alone: sand and dust storms, land tenure, agricultural land degradation, capacity-building, resource mobilisation, Science-Policy Interface functioning and budget matters all appear among the numbered decisions on the Convention portal [3]. A drought-centred paper should not erase that wider acquis. Tenure security and sand and dust storm cooperation affect drought vulnerability and pastoral livelihoods directly. Their existence also shows that Ulaanbaatar was capable of adopting substantive thematic decisions even while deferring the drought-instrument endgame [1; 3]. The selective difficulty of the drought track is therefore political and legal, not evidence of general conference paralysis.

7D. Why Meridian treats L.15's operative paragraphs as the drought decision core

Press releases summarise. Draft decisions specify. L.15's operative paragraphs are the clearest opened text stating continuation to COP18, stand-alone agenda status, and a consultation mandate subject to resources [2]. Where the press release and L.15 agree, confidence is high. Where only the press release supplies finance numbers, those numbers are attributed to the Secretariat announcement channel [1]. Where Annex I preserves brackets from COP16, Meridian reports unresolved options rather than inventing a preference among them [2]. That sourcing hierarchy is what allows a deep paper to stay within evidence while still explaining political meaning.

8. Conclusion

Ulaanbaatar strengthened the politics of rangelands and the machinery of drought finance while leaving the legal form of proactive drought management for Egypt and COP18. That combination is coherent if the next two years turn pipelines into projects and deferred text into a decision Parties can live with. It is incoherent if announcements fade and brackets return unchanged. The Convention's drought story is now an implementation race against a negotiating clock. Both clocks are running.

References

  1. UNCCD, "UNCCD COP17 advances new pathways for land restoration, drought resilience and implementation", press release, 28 August 2026, https://www.unccd.int/news-stories/press-releases/unccd-cop17-advances-new-pathways-land-restoration-drought-resilience (accessed 6 November 2026).
  2. UNCCD, ICCD/COP(17)/L.15, "Follow-up on policy frameworks and thematic issues: Drought", advance copy, 27 August 2026, https://www.unccd.int/sites/default/files/2026-08/copL15-advance%20copy2.pdf (accessed 6 November 2026).
  3. UNCCD, COP decisions portal (COP17 Ulaanbaatar listing), https://www.unccd.int/convention/cop-decisions (accessed 6 November 2026).
  4. UNCCD, decision 16/COP.17 page (Drought), https://www.unccd.int/convention/official-documents/cop-17-ulaanbaatar-mongolia-2026/documents/16cop17 (accessed 6 November 2026).
  5. UNCCD, decision 20/COP.17 (Rangelands and pastoralists), listed on [3] (accessed 6 November 2026).
  6. UNCCD, About the Convention, https://www.unccd.int/convention/about-convention (accessed 6 November 2026).
  7. UNCCD COP17 official documents portal reference in press release notes, https://www.unccd.int/cop17/official-documents (accessed 6 November 2026).
  8. Decision 24/COP.16 on drought (as acknowledged in [2]) (accessed via [2], 6 November 2026).
  9. Riyadh Political Declaration of UNCCD COP16, as welcomed in [2] Annex I (accessed via [2], 6 November 2026).
  10. International Year of Rangelands and Pastoralists framing in [1] (accessed 6 November 2026).
  11. Drought Resilience Investment Facility description in [1] (accessed 6 November 2026).
  12. Riyadh Global Drought Resilience Partnership description in [1] (accessed 6 November 2026).
  13. International Drought Resilience Observatory / Drought Resilience Index Phase II description in [1] (accessed 6 November 2026).
  14. Brazil voluntary LDN target details as reported in [1] (accessed 6 November 2026).
  15. Central Asia LDN progress as reported in [1] (accessed 6 November 2026).
  16. National drought plans statistic (more than 70 countries vs three in 2013) as reported in [1] (accessed 6 November 2026).
  17. Indigenous Peoples Caucus and Local Communities Caucus references in [1] (accessed 6 November 2026).
  18. COP18 host expectation (Egypt, 2028) as reported in [1] (accessed 6 November 2026).