The Biological Weapons Convention still has no verification mechanism more than fifty years after it opened for signature. A Working Group created by the Ninth Review Conference in 2022 is due to adopt its final report in Geneva from 7 to 11 December 2026, ahead of the Meeting of States Parties and the Tenth Review Conference in 2027. With 189 States Parties and a draft that already contemplates science-and-technology and cooperation mechanisms, plus an open-ended process on compliance, the December session will show whether States can close gaps that have lingered since the 2001 Protocol collapse, or whether the effort stalls again.
Key points
- The Convention currently has 189 States Parties, four Signatory States and four States that have neither signed nor acceded [1].
- The Ninth Review Conference (28 November to 16 December 2022) established a Working Group open to all States Parties to identify, examine and develop specific measures, including possible legally binding measures, across seven mandate areas [2].
- The Working Group was urged to finish preferably before the end of 2025; after nine substantive sessions, its tenth and concluding session is scheduled for 7 to 11 December 2026 in Geneva, with the 2026 Meeting of States Parties on 14 to 16 December [3; 4; 5].
- Draft recommendations already envisage a science-and-technology advisory mechanism, an international cooperation and assistance mechanism, and proposals for an open-ended working group on compliance and verification [5; 6].
- Unresolved issues highlighted by recent official and informal accounts include verification design, governance of the new mechanisms, transfers of materials and technologies, and financing [6; 7].
1. The Convention and the Working Group
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975. It was the first multilateral treaty to ban an entire category of weapons of mass destruction [1; 5]. States Parties undertake not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, and not to transfer them to any recipient [2].
Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention, the BWC has never acquired a standing verification organisation. A Protocol negotiation collapsed in 2001 after six years of work [6; 7]. In the years since, States Parties have relied mainly on voluntary Confidence-Building Measures, national implementation and periodic Review Conferences [7].
The Ninth Review Conference broke a long political deadlock by creating the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention. Its mandate covers: international cooperation and assistance under Article X; scientific and technological developments; confidence-building and transparency; compliance and verification; national implementation; assistance, response and preparedness under Article VII; and organisational, institutional and financial arrangements [2]. The Group works by consensus, meets in Geneva, and was allocated fifteen days a year from 2023 to 2026 [2]. Its report is to go to the Tenth Review Conference, or earlier to a Special Conference if requested [2].
2. The evidence
Membership. As at the most recent UNODA update consulted for this paper, 189 States are parties, four are signatories and four have neither signed nor joined [1]. Universalisation remains a standing priority coordinated through the annual Meeting of States Parties and the Implementation Support Unit [1].
Sessions to date. Substantive work began after an organisational meeting in March 2023. Subsequent sessions in 2023 to 2025 addressed cooperation, science and technology, confidence-building, compliance and institutional questions [7]. The seventh session (8 to 12 December 2025) began consideration of a draft final report; an extraordinary eighth session (9 to 13 February 2026) continued that examination when the December meeting did not finish it [7]. The ninth session met from 17 to 21 August 2026 under the chairmanship of Ambassador Frederico S. Duque Estrada Meyer of Brazil, with France and Georgia as vice-chairs [3; 7].
What is already on the table. An informal UNIDIR/UNODA retreat in Montreux on 29 to 30 September 2026 brought together representatives of about 32 States to work on unresolved clusters in the draft report: Article X cooperation; science and technology; and compliance and verification [5]. The same account records that the draft contemplates two mechanisms (science and technology advice, and international cooperation and assistance) and proposals for an open-ended working group on compliance and verification, with the Implementation Support Unit expected to plan for a possible start date of 2028 if agreement is reached [5]. UNODA's High Representative for Disarmament Affairs has described the tenth session as a "once-in-a-generation opportunity" to strengthen the Convention [5].
Hard points. Official meeting pages and national disarmament briefings converge on the same sticking points: verification; the governance model for the mechanisms; transfers of materials and technologies; and financing [3; 5; 7]. Side events at the ninth session also underlined the pressure that artificial intelligence and biotechnology place on traditional biosecurity assumptions, including dual-use research and attribution under ambiguity [3].
December calendar. The tenth Working Group session is listed for 7 to 11 December 2026 in the Council Chamber of the Palais des Nations; the Meeting of States Parties follows on 14 to 16 December [4]. Registration deadlines for States Parties fall on 20 November 2026 [4].
3. Analysis
The following assessments are Meridian analysis based on the evidence above.
First, the Convention's universality is not the main gap. With 189 parties [1], the BWC is already among the most widely adhered weapons bans. The practical deficit is institutional: no verification architecture, thin standing capacity and slow adaptation to biotechnology and artificial intelligence [5; 6; 7].
Second, December is a binary test of process, not of science. The Working Group was asked to finish preferably by the end of 2025 [2]. It did not. A consensus report in December would still leave the Tenth Review Conference in 2027 to decide on action, but it would convert four years of drafting into a negotiable package. Failure would not abolish the Convention; it would, as UNIDIR's director warned at Montreux, risk a return to the divisions that followed the 2001 Protocol collapse [5].
Third, verification remains the hinge. Renewed discussion of compliance measures, including possible legally binding options and an open-ended working group, is itself a change after two decades of near-silence on the subject [6; 7]. Sceptics can fairly argue that intrusive verification is hard for dual-use biology, that Confidence-Building Measures already provide transparency, and that over-designed institutions can chill legitimate public-health and industrial work. Supporters can equally argue that voluntary transparency has not closed compliance concerns and that science-and-technology review without a compliance track leaves the hardest problem untouched. Both readings fit the public record; neither can be settled from open sources alone.
Fourth, mechanisms without money and mandates will not travel. Draft text that names science-and-technology and cooperation bodies still has to settle governance, transfers and finance [5; 7]. An Implementation Support Unit start date of 2028 [5] is meaningful only if budgets and authorities follow.
4. What to watch
- Whether the Working Group adopts a consensus final report on 7 to 11 December 2026, and how the Meeting of States Parties on 14 to 16 December treats it [4].
- The balance struck among verification language, the two proposed mechanisms and financing [5; 7].
- Any move to call a Special Conference before the Tenth Review Conference in 2027 [2].
- Follow-through on Article VII operationalisation and on science-and-technology advice once (or if) mandates are agreed [3; 5].
References
- United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, "Universality" (Biological Weapons Convention), consulted 6 November 2026. https://www.unoda.org/en/our-work/weapons-mass-destruction/biological-weapons/universality (accessed 6 November 2026).
- Ninth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Final Document, BWC/CONF.IX/9, Geneva, 28 November to 16 December 2022 (Working Group mandate, paragraphs 8 to 13). https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g22/617/94/pdf/g2261794.pdf (accessed 6 November 2026).
- UNODA Meetings Place, "Biological Weapons Convention - Working Group on the strengthening of the Convention Ninth Session (2026)", 17 to 21 August 2026. https://meetings.unoda.org/bwc-/biological-weapons-convention-working-group-on-the-strengthening-of-the-convention-ninth-session-2026 (accessed 6 November 2026).
- UNODA Meetings Place, "Biological Weapons Convention - Working Group on the strengthening of the Convention Tenth Session (2026)", 7 to 11 December 2026; Indico.UN overview for the Working Group and 2026 Meeting of States Parties (14 to 16 December 2026). https://meetings.unoda.org/bwc-/biological-weapons-convention-working-group-on-the-strengthening-of-the-convention-tenth-session-2026 and https://indico.un.org/event/1018821/overview (accessed 6 November 2026).
- United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, "Montreux retreat advances work towards a stronger Biological Weapons Convention", 2 October 2026. https://unidir.org/montreux-retreat-advances-work-towards-a-stronger-biological-weapons-convention/ (accessed 6 November 2026).
- Permanent Mission of Italy to the Conference on Disarmament, "The Biological Weapons Convention" (Working Group mandate and session record through August 2026). https://italiarappdisarmo.esteri.it/en/il-disarmo/trattati-e-convenzioni/la-convenzione-sulle-armi-biologiche/ (accessed 6 November 2026).
- United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, "BWC Meetings" (Working Group mandate summary and regional-group practice). https://www.unoda.org/en/our-work/weapons-mass-destruction/biological-weapons/bwc-meetings (accessed 6 November 2026).
- UNODA Meetings Place / Indico.UN, "BWC 2026 Meeting of States Parties (14-16 December 2026)". https://indico.un.org/event/1018824/ (accessed 6 November 2026).